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Abstract 
This survey provides a broad overview of the theory of economic 
integration from the standpoint of Customs Union theory. It argues 
that Customs Union theory, as such, lacks integration and that there 
appears to be no clear possibility that recent developments in the area 
will solve this failure. In spite of this, the basic theoretical framework 
that has been laid down from Viner's seminal work and further 
developed and perfected by others, is still useful as a tool for empirical 
research on the topic. 
Resumen 
Este documento presenta una visión amplia de la Teoría de Inte-
gración Económica desde el punto de vista de la teoría de unión adua-
nera. Se argumenta que dicha teoría carece de integración y que los 
recientes desarrollos en el tema no parecen resolver esta falla. A pesar 
de esto, se sugiere que los desarrollos teóricos surgidos a partir del 
trabajo seminal de Viner y posteriormente desarrollados por otros teó-
ricos, son aún útiles como herramienta de investigación empírica en 
el tema. 
Introduction 
Economic integration, in its various forms, has provided a permanent 
motivation for economic thought. It was a major topic for 19th century 
economists as it has been for contemporary economists, especially since Viner's 
(1950) seminal work on Customs Unions. Recently, with the advance of economic 
liberalization worldwide and the trend towards the formation of economic blocs, 
economists have devoted considerable effort to the study of the formation and 
effects of the most commonly used forms of economic integration. 
From the viewpoint of economic theory, most of the literature has been 
developed through the analysis of Customs Unions (CU) while other forms of 
integration tend to be considered as variations of this basic case. This paper  4
presents an overview of the main aspects of the theory on CUs as well as some 
topics of relevance for the particular case of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In 
Chapter 2 the concept of Economic Integration is briefly discussed. A broad 
overview of the development of CUs theory is the topic of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
develops the basics of CUs theory, starting with the direction of welfare changes 
arising from economic integration and the determinants of their size, going 
through the concepts of "trade creation" and "trade diversion", and covering 
the impact on welfare of including other variables in the economic analysis. 
Chapter 5 introduces a variety of topics that have importance in current 
discussions on economic integration. Ranging from the issue of multilateralism 
versus regionalism to domestic policies harmonization, this Chapter's material 
focus on the way these issues relate to CUs. With a similar aim than that of 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 introduces four "hot issues" in the debate on economic 
integration. Finally, Chapter 7 provides some limited concluding comments. 
1.  Economic Integration 
Balassa (1987) defined economic integration both as a process and as a state 
of affairs. This distinction, although lacking theoretical relevance, is useful for 
empirical purposes. Considered as a process, economic integration comprises 
the set of political and economic measures "designed to eliminate discrimination 
between economic units that belong to different national states" (p. 43). 
Interpreted as a state of affairs, "it represents the absence of various forms of 
discrimination between national economies" (p. 43). The process of economic 
integration, then, can be regarded as the path that is followed between decreasing 
levéis of economic discrimination among countries. 
There are several forms of economic integration. They involve different 
degrees of discrimination between partner countries and between them and 
third parties. The most common forms referred to in the literature are the 
following. 
Preferential Trade Agreements (FTAs): these are arrangements through which 
member countries receive reductions in tariffs or preferential treatment within 
quantitative restrictions on their trade with other member countries while 
maintaining their normal level of trade restrictions against third parties. This   5
type of arrangement frequently applies only to a group of products and is 
unilaterally granted. 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs): these are accords by which member countries 
eliminate trade barriers among themselves while maintaining their individual 
national barriers against third countries. The disparity in the level of 
discrimination against third parties makes critical the control of trade flows 
coming through the different partners into the FTA. Normally, strict rules of 
origin and expensive customs inspection are necessary to prevent trade 
deflection. 
Customs Unions (CUs): within this type of accord, member countries remove 
all barriers to trade among themselves and adopt a common set of tariffs to be 
applied to third countries; consequently, the adoption of intra-CU rules of origin 
and the need for customs inspection become obsolete. The level of the common 
tariff is critical in determining the economic outcome of a CU and may be relevant 
in defining other domestic economic policies given its potential impact on public 
revenues (although CUs do not imply per se any harmonization of domestic 
policies). 
Common Markets (CMs): these are arrangements that comprise all the 
characteristics that define a CU, but also allow for full mobility of factors of 
production. By the same token, member countries within a CM define common 
policies regulating factor flows with third countries. The need for domestic policy 
harmonization is more compelling in this case than in the CUs case. However, 
there is no formal obligation for member countries to move in this direction. 
Economic Unions (EUs): these constitute the most complete form of economic 
integration. Besides comprising the characteristics of a CM, EUs imply the com-
plete harmonization of monetary, fiscal, industrial, and welfare policies, as well 
as, the establishment of a common pattern of foreign relations. 
The incompatibility between the aforementioned forms of economic 
integration and the long-standing principle of non-discrimination (under the 
status of the Most Favored Nation -MFN) that has guided the commonly accepted 
regulation of international trade practices, has been resolved by means of GATT 
Article XXIV that allows countries entering into any form of trade agreement to   6
be exempted from fulfilling their obligations under Article I (ruling their 
commitment to non-discrimination), provided that some criteria (referred to 
below) are met. 
To the already complex group of trade arrangements must be added the set 
of combinations that result from the interaction among countries participating 
in different arrangements. Lipsey (1991), has outlined three distinct models to 
describe these situations. First, the "hub-and-spoke" model, studied by 
Wonnacott (1990), considers the case in which a country has separate bilateral 
(or plurilateral) trade agreements with a group of countries that do not have 
trade agreements among themselves; in this way, the "hub" enjoys free (or 
preferential) access to the market of the "spokes" while each of them can have 
free access only to the market of the "hub" and is prevented from realizing gains 
vis-a-vis other "spokes". Second, the overlapping regional free trade model des-
cribes the situation that derives from an "original" bilateral free trade agreement 
to which subsequent trade agreements are added by means of negotiations 
comprising only one of the "original" partners and different third countries, 
producing as a result that each of the former are included in some agreements 
while excluded from others. Krissoff and Sharples (1993) point out, that the 
difficulty in enforcing an overlapping free trade area may be high; particularly 
in aspects related with the transshipment of goods across free trade areas and 
the application of rules of origin criteria. Finally, in the plurilateral regional model 
several countries establish a free trade area in which all member countries have 
(and permit) access to all markets. 
2.  A General Glimpse on Customs Union Theory 
As Viner (1950, p. 41) has pointed out, CUs have more commonly enjoyed a 
favorable than an adverse opinion about their impact on economic welfare 
among both free-traders and protectionists. This paradoxical situation is not 
due to the fact that CUs can exactly meet the requirements imposed by the two 
kinds of approaches, but instead, is due to the ambiguous net economic result 
they produce in terms of improving or deteriorating economic welfare. 
In either situation, the bottom line in judging the economic convenience or 
inconvenience of CUs rests on an implicit or explicit comparison between their   7
results and the optimality provided by free trade in achieving an efficient resource 
allocation. Leaving aside political or political economy considerations, insofar 
as CUs may be considered steps towards the accomplishment of global free 
trade, they can be regarded as beneficial for the economy. 
On the liberalization side, the extreme case of CUs, that is a CU that comprises 
all of the world's economies, corresponds to the situation of free trade. As CUs 
involve only a few countries and therefore the use of tariffs (or other distortive 
policies), the resource allocation resulting from their implementation is 
suboptimal. In this sense, CU theory has been considered as a particular case of 
the theory of the second best. Lipsey and Lancaster were the first to note this 
particular feature of CU theory (Balassa, 1987). 
Alternatively, observing that CUs are based on the principle of geographical 
discrimination, Lipsey (1960) has defined the theory of CUs "as that branch of 
tariff theory which deals with the effects of geographically discriminatory 
changes in trade barriers" (p. 496). 
Since Viner's work and up to 1960 when Lipsey performed a general survey 
on the topic (Lipsey, 1960), research on CU theory concentrated in the welfare 
effects arising from the changing trading flows that stem as a consequence of 
CUs formation. The earlier CU theory, prior to Viner, considered that tariffs 
reduction implied in CUs were a movement towards free trade and therefore 
that they increase welfare even if not resulting in an optimum. To some extent, 
the value of Viner's research rests on the fact that through the introduction of 
the concepts of trade creation (welfare improving effect) and trade diversion 
(welfare deteriorating effect) he demonstrated that the net effects of CUs on 
economic welfare vary and that they may be welfare improving or welfare 
deteriorating depending on the particular characteristics of the case. 
While Viner's analysis focused on the production effects of CUs, the 
contributions of Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) added the consumption 
dimension to CU theory. Allowing for the consideration of non-zero elasticity 
demand curves, Meade (1955) introduced the concept of trade expansion as a 
factor potentially improving economic welfare; this aspect of CU theory, known 
also as the intercommodity substitution effect, is also explored by Lipsey (1957)  8
who shows how a trade diverting CU may be welfare improving because of 
consumption considerations. 
Besides considering production and consumption effects, CU theory also 
covered other important related aspects. Among them, it is worth mentioning 
the selection of partner countries, the impact of CUs on terms of trade, the role 
of administrative costs, the loss of tariff revenues, the distinction between no-
minal and effective tariffs, the role of economies of scale, and the effects of CUs 
on firms and industry efficiency. 
According to Lipsey (1960), welfare gains or losses related with CUs may 
arise from several sources to which more or less attention had been devoted so 
far in the literature. In his view, CU theory was almost completely confined to 
the effects of specialization according to comparative advantage (the classic gains 
from trade) with slight attention to issues related with economies of scale and 
terms of trade, while aspects arising from efficiency considerations were ruled 
out under the assumption that any analyzed production process is technically 
efficient and the problem of changes in the rate of economic growth is completely 
dismissed. 
In 1972, Krauss published another well known survey on the developments 
of CU theory. Considering research efforts performed between his and Lipsey's 
survey, he concluded that the most significant development in this field was the 
study of the motivation for forming CUs. In Krauss' words, "[t]he question of 
the "economic rationality" of customs unions thus has been the theoretical issue 
of the past decade just as in the previous one the major issue ... was whether a 
customs union represented a movement towards freer trade or greater 
protection." (Krauss, 1972; p. 413) 
Within this context the works of Johnson (1965) and Cooper and Massell 
(1965) have a great significance - referenced in Krauss (1972). Both studies extend 
to its limit the argument that countries participate in trade creating CUs with 
the aim of reducing the distorting effects of their own tariffs. The conclusion of 
their analyses is that participation in a CU is inferior to unlilateral elimination 
of tariffs, given that the latter leads to a greater degree of trade creation while 
avoiding any trade diversion effect (Balassa, 1987). As a consequence, explaining   9
the motivation that countries have for forming CUs is traced back to non-
economic, political, or strategic reasons. National preference for industry (either 
as a public good or as a long-term objective) is one of the more common examples 
of this explanation. 
The elimination of the resource allocation motivation for forming CUs helped 
direct economists' attention to both what have been called "dynamic effects" 
and terms of trade effects (Krauss, 1972). By the time Krauss' article was 
published, the idea of "dynamic effects" referred mainly to the relationship 
between protection and efficiency and to the possibility of exploiting economies 
of scale and employing more up-to-date technology. 
From Krauss' point of view, arguments discussing the importance of 
"dynamic effects" as the motivation for CUs are weak and even tenuous and 
his opinion partially coincides with criticisms made by authors like Corden (1970, 
1972), Johnson (1962) and Pearce (1970) - referenced in Krauss (1972). On the 
other hand, by this time studies on the potential terms of trade effects of CUs 
had been extensively analyzed (Krauss, 1972) and results from them were found 
to vary widely according to the assumptions that were made. 
Variations in the terms of trade as a consequence of CUs may affect the 
economic welfare of the participating country, of the partner country, and of 
third countries in different directions; therefore, the issue of distributional effects 
from CUs arises as a controversial topic in the field as well as the appropriateness 
of judging CUs' results according to their effects on each of the participating 
countries, on the rest of the world, or on the global economy as a whole. The 
increased acceptance of the importance of non-economic motivations as the basis 
for forming CUs plus the diversity of results obtained when terms of trade effects 
are taken into account, led to the recognition of partner-choosing as a relevant 
topic in CU theory. 
According to Krauss (1972), "[t]here are in essence two approaches to the 
theory of customs unions depending upon one's assumption as to the nature of 
the political process. The first assumes government to be "irrational" or "non-
economic", and focuses on the economic costs of such irrationality... The second 
approach assumes that government does desire to maximize the economic   10
welfare of the community but is ill-informed as to how to do it..." (p. 434). In 
Krauss' perception, the first approach is the correct point of departure in 
analyzing CUs because of two reasons; first, governments are not neutral in 
pursuing economic welfare; they also serve their own interest. Second, 
economists have failed to develop a general argument to explain the convenience 
of CUs on economic grounds (allowing for the qualification that, with the 
exception of Kemp's work (1969) - referenced in Krauss (1972), CU theory had 
not yet explored the possibility of assuming factor mobility and non-fixed supply 
of factors of production to the economy). 
Research on CU issues is said to have kept pace with developments in CUs 
themselves (Krauss, 1972). According to Gunter's review of the literature on 
CUs (Gunter, 1989), this affirmation is still true. Gunter (1989) shows that the 
current phase in the development of CU theory is characterized by an interest 
in a series of specific topics that, even though present in the literature long ago, 
are of great importance for CU theory. The development of multiple commodity 
models, the study of terms of trade effects, tax unions, economies of scale, and, 
to some extent, the relationship between CUs and economic development are 
mentioned as the most salient lines of current research. However, in referring to 
the latter, Hazlewood (1987) has mentioned that relatively little development of 
the theory has focused on CUs in the context of economic development. 
As has happened since the beginning of the development of CU theory, 
empirical research has consumed much of the effort devoted to the field in recent 
years. Perhaps this is the reason why Gunter points out that "[w]hile each indi-
vidual study attempts to incorporate a more realistic assumption in a particular 
area, each is so specific that it is difficult to integrate the results of the different 
specialized models into a guide to how a customs union actually works." (p. 2) 
According to this view, CU theory is lacking integration not only because of the 
wide variety of topics, assumptions, and methods of analysis, but also, and most 
importantly, because of the absence of a systematic linkage between empirical 
results and theory. 
Although Gunter mentions that very little attention has been given to gene-
ral equilibrium models, with the launching of different initiatives of economic   11
integration either in the context of the conformation of trade blocks or within 
multilateral liberalization, an impressive amount of empirical research, including 
a fair number of general equilibrium models, has been performed in the last 
fifteen years. To have an idea of the dimension of the process of economic 
integration it may suffice to mention that between 1990 and 1994 approximately 
39 reciprocal regional trading arrangements were subscribed worlwide 
(Harmsen and Leidy, 1994); this situation has considerably strengthened 
economic research on the interaction between multilateral and regional (or bila-
teral) trade liberalization. 
Even though dominated by empirical research, there are also theoretical 
developments in the field of CU theory. For instance, Harrison et al. (1993), 
developed an alternative welfare decomposition to the use of the concepts of 
trade creation and trade diversion for analyzing the effects of CUs; Yeh (1992), 
draws on the differences between tariffs and import quotas when issuing 
countries enter into CUs; Staiger (1994), discusses the issue of gradual trade 
liberalization; Feenstra (1990), modeled the dynamics of distributing the gains 
from trade with incomplete information; Michael and Miller (1992) analyzed 
the effect of CUs with international capital mobility in the framework of the 
Harris-Todaro model; and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1992) considered the 
effect of variable labor supply and taxes on wages on trade creation and trade 
diversion under CUs. 
In spite of the wealth of economic research in CUs, both at the empirical and 
theoretical levels, it is apparent that CU theory is not a coherent and integrated 
unit. The old debate between free trade and protectionism remains a central 
issue and non-economic considerations prove to be quite relevant in determining 
the conformation of CUs and in influencing their analysis as well. To some extent, 
CU theory has been affected by the debate between the "new" and the "old" 
trade theories. The importance of non-comparative-advantage sources of 
specialization, even though not new in the economic argumentation, has been 
increasing since the late 1970s due to both the development of advanced 
modeling techniques and the rise of "strategic" trade policies (Krugman, 1993). 
CUs may be regarded as instrumental in maximizing national welfare regardless 
of their effects on global income and therefore as an appropriate means for   12
implementing "strategic" trade policies. They may also be perceived as a 
pertinent vehicle towards generalized trade liberalization and the achievement 
of an optimal resource allocation. While oscillating between this extremes, the 
difficulty in reaching an integrated CU theory is not surprising. 
3.  Customs Union Theory 
3.1 Welfare Gains 
Independent of the particular emphasis that the different studies on CUs have, 
at the bottom they all collapse to the common problem of the effect of economic 
integration on economic welfare. Given the second best nature of CU theory, 
which prevents a priori assertions of the direction of welfare changes, much of 
the research attempts to determine the conditions under which it is likely that a 
CU will improve welfare and whether or not it is a preferable alternative to 
unilateral tariff policy. 
However, there is a great deal of implicit controversy around the purpose 
and scope of this attempt. As Krauss (1972) described it, there is a viewpoint 
that considers that the purpose of the analysis ". . . is to establish universal a 
priori laws..." (p. 414) and that the closer are the theoretical assumptions to the 
conditions of the "real world" the better is the derived law; in contrast, there is 
another position according to which "... the proper purpose of a priori reasoning 
is to highlight, in a disciplined and rigorous manner, the relevant aspects of the 
problem under investigation..." (p.414). Considering this dichotomy, it is easy 
to visualize how difficult it is to draw upon a generally acceptable set of 
conditions that make the CU likely to improve economic welfare. 
Almost every significant contributor to CU theory has elaborated his list of 
conditions for CUs to be welfare improving. Viner (1950; pp. 51-52) provided 
one that is supposed to be valid whether the CU's effects are appraised in terms 
of the member countries alone or of the world as a whole; it can be summarized 
as follows: (1) the CU's economic area must be large, (2) the common external 
tariff should be lower than the previous individual tariffs before third countries, 
(3) member countries must rival in the kind of products that are characterized 
by high-cost production and that were previously protected, (4) there must be   13
considerable differences in unit costs of production for protected industries of 
the same kind within the CU, (5) higher tariffs in potential export markets in 
third countries for products in which CU's members have comparative 
advantage reduce the risk from decreasing the degree of specialization between 
the CU and the rest of the world, (6) the wider the range of products for which 
CU's members can provide lower unit costs for other member countries than 
third country suppliers, the more likely the CU is to be welfare improving, and 
(7) the converse of number (6), is the presence of a small range of industries 
within the CU that do not provide goods at unit costs lower than third suppliers. 
Meade's (1955) main conclusion on the welfare effects of CUs is that"... it is 
impossible to pass judgment upon customs unions in general" (p. 107) and better 
enumerates a set of generalizations on CUs. Since this author relaxed Viner's 
assumption about fixed proportions in consumption, his first generalization 
establishes "... some general prejudice in favor of customs unions ..." (p. 107) 
because of the trade expansion effect that arises as a consequence of tariff 
reductions. Then he draws on some conditions that are similar to those 
enumerated by Viner, including the generalization over the competitive character 
of partner countries (to which he added the possibility that they may be actually 
very competitive but potentially very complementary), the economic size of the 
CU, and the proportional size of trade between member countries in the pre-CU 
situation (related to Viner's conditions 6 and 7). Finally, Meade adds some other 
conditions that make CUs more likely to be welfare improving: higher initial 
tariff rates between member countries; low tariff rates in the rest of the world 
(that may be contradictory with Viner's condition number 5); extensive use of 
quantitative restrictions in the rest of the world instead of import taxes; 
potentially large economies of scale in those industries within the CU that are 
likely to expand at the expense of other member's industries; and the preference 
for "... a partial all-round reduction by the partner countries of their duties on 
each other's trade... [instead of] the subsequent total elimination of those duties" 
(p. 110), given that this condition reduces the risk of trade diversion before third 
countries (to which Viner's condition number 5 tries to prevent to). 
Meade's last generalization is mentioned by Lipsey (1960) as an example of 
the only kind of generalization that it is possible to make within CU theory. Its   14
importance derives from the second best character of CU theory and in Lipsey's 
terms the key point is that "[i]f the economy is moved sufficiently far past the 
second-best optimum welfare will be lowered by the change. From this it follows 
that, if there is a unique second-best level for the tax being varied, a small 
variation is more likely to raise welfare than is a large variation" (p. 507). 
A second generalization that Lipsey considers refers to expenditure 
proportions between the three kinds of goods that exist within a CU: those 
purchased domestically, those from partner countries, and those from third 
countries. CUs tend to move price relationships between products to or away 
from equality with the real rates of transformation between the corresponding 
products (equalization of all relative prices and rates of transformation is the 
condition for optimization); tariff elimination among member countries brings 
relative prices and rates of transformation to equality while moving in the 
opposite direction the relationship between imports from partner countries and 
from third countries. Therefore, imports from partner countries produce gains, 
because of the first effect, and, simultaneously, losses, because of the second 
effect; consequently, what matters the most in determining the net effect of a 
CU is the relationship between purchases of domestic products and imports 
from third countries. In this sense, "... the sort of countries who ought to form 
customs unions are those doing a high proportion of their foreign trade with 
their union partner, and making a high proportion of their total expenditure on 
domestic trade." (pp. 508-509) 
Modifying assumptions upon which the analysis is based or putting more 
emphasis on non strictly trade effects of CUs, affects considerably the set of 
conditions forming the economic case for CUs. Some economists attribute big 
potential gains to economies of scale (that comprise cost-reduction effects and 
trade suppression effects) or to enhanced efficiency. Others estimate that the order 
and timing of tariff reductions can be as important to a country as is the agreed 
final state of the CU. Allowing for increasing returns (and "strategic" trade policy) 
may also change dramatically the set of generalizations arising from CU theory 
and makes possible the consideration of the redistribution of world welfare in 
favor of the countries initiating a CU as the true purpose of CUs.   15
There is also an empirical issue that generates controversy not only within 
CU theory but also in the context of international trade theory in general. It is 
that of the seeming smallness of the estimated welfare gains and losses stemming 
from CUS, at least as measured as a percentage of GNP. This fact has been 
extensively used by advocates of the economies of scale argument and the forced 
efficiency argument to erode the importance of the orthodox resource allocation 
effects as the motivation for developing CUs. Divergent opinions on this point 
are easily found in the literature. For instance, McCulloch (1993) mentions that 
even selective trade liberalization provides larger markets and associated 
dynamic effects and points out that the new industrial-organization-based theory 
of trade supports this view and that "... recent empirical studies confirm that 
welfare gains from regional liberalization can be far greater when markets are 
imperfectly competitive..." (p. 369). On the other hand, Krugman (1993) asserts 
that "... we have looked pretty thoroughly into those dynamic aspects and 
found their policy implications to be limited." (p. 366) 
Finally, as McCulloch (1993) has mentioned, trade theory in general tends to 
dismiss the effects of trade liberalization on distribution and the fact that 
significant redistribution strongly discourages trade liberalization through 
political pressure. A related aspect has to do with adjustment costs. Most 
theoretical arguments overstate the benefits accruing from trade liberalization 
in that they compare alternative equilibria (pre and post trade liberalization) 
without taking into account costs involved in going from one to the other. Not 
only important distributional effects impinge upon the size of adjustment costs 
but displaced resources that remain idle generate opportunity costs and cause 
political difficulties. In spite of these shortcomings and considering the 
unavoidable divergence between "real world" conditions and theoretical 
assumptions, it is clear that free trade is still considered the best solution for 
improving economic welfare and that any form of economic integration that 
helps in moving towards this goal ought to be considered desirable. 
3.2 Trade Diversion and Trade Creation 
Viner's (1950) concepts of trade creation and trade diversion set the basis for 
analyzing welfare effects of CUs. According to this perspective, "[t]he analysis will   16
be directed toward finding answers to the following questions: insofar as the esta-
blishment of the customs union results in change in the national locus of production 
of goods purchased, is the net change one of diversion of purchases to lower or 
higher money-cost sources of supply, abstracting from duty-elements in money-
costs: (a) for each of the customs union countries taken separately; (b) for the two 
combined; (c) for the outside world; (d) for the world as a whole?" (p. 42) 
Trade creation occurs whenever trade shifts from higher to lower cost sources 
of goods while trade diversion implies the opposite movement. If trade creation 
is predominant, at least one of the members of the CU must benefit, all of them 
may benefit, and in the long run the world in general benefits; although, someone 
must lose in the short run as trade is diverted from old to new suppliers. On the 
other hand, if trade diversion is predominant, at least one of the member 
countries must lose, all may lose, and the world as a whole will lose. Whether, 
in Viner's analysis, trade creation or trade diversion effects will predominate 
seems to depend on the volume of trade associated with each of them. 
This is precisely one of the criticisms that Meade (1955) made of Viner's 
approach; there is a lack of criteria as to how to weigh the economic gains and 
losses arising from CUs. Meade established that in order to determine whether 
a CU is trade creating or trade diverting, not only the volume of trade on which 
costs have been raised or lowered must be considered, but also the extent to 
which these costs have changed on a per-unit basis. 
Weighting trade volume by the corresponding change in unit costs is a solution 
that can be applied without trouble in the context of Viner's analysis; however, 
if the assumptions establishing fixed proportions in consumption and f ixed costs 
of production in each country are relaxed, the use of this rule becomes more 
complicated. Relaxing the first assumption and maintaining the second one 
makes it necessary to include welfare changes caused by the trade expansion 
effect (which are positive) as well as welfare changes arising from losses in tariff 
revenues as countries enter the CU. The latter could be dismissed if it were 
possible for the government to replace foregone revenues by means of other 
taxes without affecting economic incentives while reaching the desired 
distributional effects.       17
Meade's analysis set the basis for the standard calculation of economic effects 
arising from CUs. Figure 1 illustrates the net effects of a CU in a partial 
equilibrium framework, assuming no transportation or transaction costs. Curves 
D and S represent good's X demand and supply curves, respectively; Pc is the 
export price of good X in the lowest cost supplier (that remains outside the CU); 
P'c is the import price of good X in country A resulting from the issuing of an 
import tariff (t); and Pb is the export price of good X coming from partner country 
B, which is equal to the import price of this product in country A (since no tariff s 




Figure 1 Single Product Partial Equilibrium Welfare Effects of a Customs Union 
In the initial situation, before the CU, country A buys good X from country C 
at price P'c, consuming quantity P'cA of product domestically produced and 
quantity AD of imports. With the functioning of the CU, country A shifts its 
imports from country C to country B, provided Pb is less than P'c. In this situation, 
consumption as a whole increases (trade expansion effect), domestic production 
decreases to PbB, and imports (now originating in country B) rise to BF. 
Consumer surplus increases in area Pc'DFPb, producer surplus diminishes in 
area Pc'ABPb, and area ADEC is transferred from the government (foregone 
Price 
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revenues) to consumers. Consequently, the trade creation effect from the CU is 
equivalent to area ABC+DEF while the trade diversion effect is equal to area 
CENM. Therefore, after the CU, country A might be better off or worse off 
depending on whether area ABC+DEF is greater or less than area CENM. 
However, the partial equilibrium approach takes into account only what 
Meade (1955; p. 67) called the primary effect of the CU; that is, changes in trade 
flows stemming from tariff variations affecting a particular product under the 
assumption that income and all other prices remain unchanged. Further 
complexities arise from the introduction of secondary effects of the CU (Meade, 
1955; pp. 67-68). These effects are produced as a consequence of the substitutive 
or complementary character of the relationship between the product whose tariff 
has been modified and other products (whose tariffs may or may not be 
modified)
11. Consideration of all possible (or relevant) secondary effects within 
the economy requires the use of a general equilibrium approach. 
Another assumption in welfare analysis within the partial equilibrium 
approach is that any increase (decrease) in imports is compensated by an 
equivalent increase (decrease) in exports, so that the country's balance of 
payments remains in equilibrium (Krauss, 1972). Mechanisms employed in order 
to reach balance of payments equilibrium define the scope of Meade's (1955; p. 
87) tertiary effects of a CU. These mechanisms comprise (1) direct controls over 
trade flows, (2) manipulation of the inflation rate, and (3) adjustments of the 
exchange rate; each of them may have different implications for the nation's 
economic welfare (increasing or decreasing it), depending on the specific 
conditions of the economy. In this case, again, it is necessary to resort to general 
equilibrium models to assess the net effects of CUs. 
 
Relaxation of fixed proportions in consumption and fixed costs of production 
assumptions not only allows the introduction of trade expansion effects and 
intercommodity substitution effects but also the elimination of the necessary 
association between trade diversion (arising from the production side) and 
                                                           
1 According to Lipsey (1960), these effects, also called intercommodity substitution effects, 
were discovered independently by Meade (1955), Gehrels (1956), and Lipsey (1957).   19
welfare losses. Lipsey (1957) shows that a trade diverting CU may be welfare 
improving for a country and that even in the case in which world production is 
considered fixed, changes in relative prices modify the pattern of consumption 
within a country producing consumption effects that may be welfare improving. 
igure 2 shows the case of a trade diverting CU that is welfare improving f or a 
country (Lipsey, 1957; pp. 41-43). In a free trade context, country A produces 
good Y and imports good X from country C, the lowest cost producer of this 
good, maximizing welfare at point G along price line DE where indifference 
curve I is reached. Price line DE describes the terms of trade between goods Y 
and X, produced in countries A and C respectively. Then, an import tariff equal 
to EF/OF is issued on all imports of good X and terms of trade between good Y 
and good X move to line DF. If tariff revenues were returned to consumers, the 
new equilibrium will be reached along line DE (instead of at point H, at which 
line DF is tangent to indifference curve I') at a point where an indifference curve 
with an slope equal to that of DF cuts price line DE. Point K shows the new 
equilibrium and indifference curve I" the corresponding maximum welfare level 
(consumers are not able to reach a higher indifference curve trading along their 












Figure 2 Welfare Improving Effects of a Trade Diverting Customs Union 
Source: Lipsey (1957); p. 42   20
If country A forms a trade diverting CU with country B, the line indicating 
the terms of trade between good Y and good X and pertaining to trade with 
country B must lie at any place between lines DF and DE (if trade diversion is to 
occur, terms of trade with B must be at least equal to DF; similarly, if country C 
is the lowest cost producer, terms of trade with B must lie to the left of DE). 
Now, line DV represents the terms of trade that correspond to indifference curve 
I" and, as a consequence, if terms of trade with country B lie to the left of line DV 
country A will lose with the existence of the CU, but if they lie to the right there 
will be gains from the trade diverting CU (an indifference curve higher than I" 
could be reached in this case)
2. 
Another exception to Viner's rule about the relationship between trade 
diversion and welfare effects of CUs is found when the assumption of constant 
costs of production in the home country is relaxed. Krauss (1972) mentions how 
Melvin's (1969) and Bhagwati's (1971) studies demonstrated that, even allowing 
for fixed proportions in consumption, the variability in costs of production results 
in welfare gains that can exceed losses stemming from trade diversion. 
These criticisms of Viner's concept of trade diversion as equivalent to a welfare 
loss have led to the acceptance of the inconvenience of labeling CUs' welfare 
effects on the basis of production effects and therefore to the inclusion of 
production and consumption effects in determining whether there is net trade 
creation or net trade diversion. Another issue arising from this criticisms has 
been the proposal of labeling CUs' effects by means of concepts other than trade 
creation and trade diversion in order to avoid potential confusion. Lipsey (1960) 
proposed the use of inter-country substitution and inter-commodity substitution, 
the first corresponding to Viner's trade creation and trade diversion effects and 
the latter to consumption effects. Johnson (1962) recommended a different 
terminology and defined the terms trade creation and trade diversion in such a 
way that each contains production and consumption components - referenced 
in Krauss (1972). More recently, Harrison et al. (1993) proposed to differentiate 
                                                           
2 Krauss (1972) pointed out that according to Melvin (1969) the equilibrium terms of trade are 
equivalent to the partner's marginal rate of transformation only in a special case and that they 
must lie somewhere in between that ratio and the ratio existing in the importing country. However, 
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between home-price effects and tariff-revenue effects as a way to analyze welfare 
changes instead of the traditional concepts. 
In spite of these proposals, the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion 
continue to be commonly used in analyzing the economic effects of CUs and the 
standard procedure outlined by Meade (and exemplified here by means of a 
partial equilibrium diagram), that includes production and consumption effects, 
provides the basis for much of the economic modeling of CUs and trade 
agreements in general. 
3.3Terms of Trade Effects 
Terms of trade, under the ñames of commodity or net barter terms of trade 
(Findlay, 1987), are defined as the relative price of exportable to importable goods 
and are usually measured as the ratio of an export price Index to an import price 
Index (their changes being calculated in relation to a given base year). As 
mentioned before (referring to Meade's tertiary effects of CUs on the economy), 
when international trade is considered within an economic model there is need 
to determine equilibrium valúes of the terms of trade in order to reach balance 
of payments equilibrium and a stable solution to the system. In Findlay's (1987) 
words " [t]he determination of the terms of trade is thus technically nothing other 
than that of finding the equilibrium vector(s) of relative prices for general 
equilibrium models in which there is a world market for tradeable goods and 
internationally mobile factors, and national markets for non-traded goods and 
internationally immobile factors." (p. 624) 
Terms of trade, therefore, constitute an important issue in trade theory and 
play a key role in the determination of welfare effects arising from international 
trade. For instance, a shift in preferences from domestic to imported producís 
should under normal conditions raise welfare in the partner country as the excess 
demand generated for imported products produces an improvement in the 
exporting country's terms of trade; also, in cases where a country has some 
degree of market power (monopoly or monopsony power), the alteration of 
terms of trade may become an objective of trade policy inasmuch as gains arising 
from improvements in terms of trade outweigh losses resulting from the 
reduction in trade volume (the optimum tariff issue).   22
The terms of trade effects issue is important in the case in which at least one 
of the partner countries is a "big" trading country, that is when it is able to affect 
international prices through trade policy. On the contrary, when partner 
countries are "small" there are no terms of trade effects and the economy's 
equilibrium may be re-established by means of any of the mechanisms 
enumerated by Mead. 
3.4 Economies of Scale 
Amongst the factors that have been traditionally identified as the dynamic effects 
of economic integration, economies of scale are probably the most important. 
Although in the context of economic analysis its formalization and measurement 
are difficult to achieve, "... many economists believe they are of far greater 
importance than the more theoretically tractable static benefits from Ricardian 
comparative advantage" (McCulloch, 1993; p. 369). In fact, the case for economies 
of scale constitutes one of the foundations for the rise of the new trade theory. 
Both in political and economic circles there has been widespread acceptance 
and support of regional free trade initiatives on the grounds of the economies of 
scale argument, in spite of the generally ambiguous economic welfare results of 
such agreements, However, this has not been the common position in CU theory. 
Viner (1950; pp. 45-47), for instance, based on the assumption that firms located 
in small economies and operating on a moderate size basis are as efficient or nearly 
as efficient (in terms of unit costs of production) as large-scale firms, denied any 
practical importance to the case for economies of scale as an economic motivation 
for the formation of CUs. Instead, he highlighted the relevance of technological 
development and supply conditions of factors of production as determinants of 
output expansion without increase of unit costs, in the context of a constant over-
all size economy. Johnson (1962) and Pearce (1970) - referenced in Krauss (1972), 
objected also to the presumable importance of economies of scale in CU theory on 
the grounds that partner countries' demands cannot be added into a single entity, 
increasing the effective demand for the commodities in question, because of 
differences in income levéis, culture, and consumption habits.   23
From a different perspective and considering the existence of economies of 
scale to be important, Corden (1972) developed the concepts of cost reduction 
effect and trade suppression effect to capture the economic consequences of this 
phenomenon. The cost reduction effect refers to the increase in welfare that 
appears as a consequence of the expanded output and the concomitant decrease 
in average costs of production after the CU is formed. Similarly, the trade 
suppression effect refers to the decrease in welfare arising from the replacement 
of imports from their most efficient sources by less efficient producers within 
the CU. Noting that the introduction of economies of scale implies relaxing the 
classical CU theory's assumption of constant costs of production, Krauss (1972) 
pointed out that, in this case, the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion 
must not just be complemented but really extended to cover these new effects. 
Consideration of economies of scale leads to ambiguous results in terms of 
the welfare effects of CUs; again, they may be positive or negative according to 
the particular conditions of the countries entering the CU. There is, besides, 
another difficulty in analyzing the effects of economies of scale in the context of 
CU theory. The estimation of these effects rests on a technique developed by 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1967) and further elaborated by Williamson (1971) 
that, according to Krauss (1972) "... requires the average cost curve to be the 
firm's supply curve rather than the marginal cost curve, implying an average 
cost theory of pricing that is inconsistent with traditional profit maximization 
theory" (p. 432). 
An argument that tends to qualify the potential for welfare gains arising from 
economies of scale is pointed out by Lipsey (1960). It refers to the distinction 
between the long-run marginal cost of production, which is the relevant varia-
ble when talking about economies of scale, and the marginal cost of producing 
and selling more goods. If markets are growing it is relatively easy for firms to 
realize gains from economies of scale; however, if markets are static, it is quite 
possible that decreasing marginal costs of production, associated with economies 
of scale, may coexist with increasing costs of selling products given that the 
individual firm's market share has to be increased at the expense of other 
competitors. In this situation, gains from economies of scale may not be exploited 
by firms competing in the marketplace.   24
3.5 Integration vs. Unilateral Tariff Reduction 
The debate about economic integration versus unilateral tariff reduction is 
rooted in two related issues. First, whether the motivation of member countries 
is to liberalize their economies and therefore to eliminate economic distortions 
arising from their own tariffs or to protect their economies from third countries 
competition. Second, whether there are some non-economic motivations for the 
formation of CUs. 
Viner (1950) mentioned the idea that in an early phase of the movement 
towards the formation of CUs, the extension of high effective protection over 
expanded economic areas was probably the main motivation in their formation. 
Actually, he attributed to this feature the failure to effectively achieve the 
operation of most planned CUs as member countries were averse to open their 
respective markets to the competition of partner countries' production. The role 
of non-tariff barriers to trade was an important element in the manipulation of 
the real degree of openness to trade among partner countries. 
In classical CU theory, participation in a trade creating CU is considered a 
step towards free trade and therefore as a way of achieving enhanced economic 
efficiency. Under this assumption economic analysis shows that CUs are infe-
rior to unilateral (or non-preferential) tariff elimination in that the latter produ-
ces greater levéis of trade creation while avoiding completely trade diversion 
effects. Consequently, from an economic point of view, the rationale for the 
formation of CUs is weak and unilateral tariff elimination should be the path to 
increase economic welfare. 
Cooper and Massell (1965) and Johnson (1965) -referenced in Balassa (1987) 
- worked in this direction and established that non-economic purposes should 
be the real motivation for governments to establish CUs; that is, that some form 
of protectionism provides the motivation for them. In the perspective of Krauss 
(1972), what was needed was "... an "economic" theory of protectionism whose 
development would allow a comparison of non-preferential tariff policy with 
customs union as alternative protectionist rather than liberalizing mechanisms" 
(p. 417). As was mentioned before, de-emphasizing resource allocation objectives   25
as  the reason f or CUs formation led economists' attention to the study of dynamic 
gains from trade. 
Both Cooper and Massell's and Johnson's research include the consideration 
of public goods in modeling and evaluating CUs. The preference for industry is 
the public good that is considered relevant in these studies; in the first case, to 
try to determine how membership in a CU provides an specific country with an 
economically better way of achieving industrial objectives than pure 
protectionism; in the second case, to try to explain why governments follow 
trade policies that are seemingly irrational from the point of view of economic 
welfare. The conclusion in both cases is that CUs are superior to pure 
protectionism in achieving industrial goals at a lower economic cost. This 
conclusion remains valid as long as countries are, for whatever reason, unable 
to grant and adjust direct production subsidies which are a more efficient 
mechanism than CUs in industrial policy. The reasons justifying the preference 
for industry vary in scope and applicability; among the most common it is worth 
mentioning long-term economic growth objectives, the pressure of industrial 
f irms and workers to increase their profits and wages, the achievement of positive 
externalities, and national aspirations and rivalries. 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) -referenced in Balassa (1987) - showed that, 
even in the absence of a preference for industry, unilateral tariff reductions may 
not be superior to CUs if it is assumed that tariffs exist in partner and non-
member countries prior to the formation of the CU. This is because tariff 
elimination among partner countries allows the home country to sell a bigger 
amount of products duty free and at higher prices than before and to reduce the 
amount of income lost from tariff revenues that arises from trade with third 
countries. 
Other arguments have been raised on the superiority of CUs over unilateral 
tariff elimination. Floystad (1975) - referenced in Gunter (1989) - argued that, 
assuming wage fixity and relative capital immobility between exposed and 
protected industries within a country, CUs are superior to unilateral tariff 
elimination in that they provide lower levéis of unemployment for a given trade 
déficit. Fries (1984) - referenced in Gunter (1989) - showed that CUs may be   26
preferable in the case in which there is uncertainty about world commodity prices; 
although, in his argument at least one of the member countries must be a net loser 
in the ex post CU situation and theref ore incentives f or its permanence are weak. 
In general, the case f or the superiority of CUs over unilateral tariff elimination 
generates opposition from those who consider that this type of argument tends 
to justify irrational economic behavior orí the part of governments and to 
encourage practicing managed trade policies. Gunter (1989) argües that "[i]f a 
customs union is entirely a political construct, then the economic effects of the 
union may not be just irrelevant but actually perverse" (p. 9). 
3.6 Partnership Issues 
The issue of choosing the set of parmers that better serve the purpose of f orming 
a trade creating CU was implicitly discussed when treating the welfare effects of 
CUs and the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. However, there are 
some points that are worth emphasizing. First, countries are not always free to 
choose the set of partners they want to form a CU with; frequently, political and 
strategic considerations (or any type of non-economic reason) lead countries to 
establish trade agreements in spite of potentially adverse economic consequences. 
Second, finding suitable partners that meet most of the desired characteristics for 
a CU to be surely trade creating is a difficult task and most probably a conflictive 
one; as Hirschman (1981) has pointed out, political support for f orming a CU is 
most likely to come initially from those who expect to benefit from trade diversion. 
Some of the features that should characterize either partner countries or the 
relationship between them and the home country are the following. (1) Their 
economies must be competitive rather than complementary and differences in 
per unit costs of production in competitive products should be high; (2) pre-CU 
tariffs between them must be high as compared to those in the rest of the world; 
(3) member countries must be the main trading partner of each other in the 
products in which they maintain trade flows; (4) a relatively high proportion of 
each country's expenditure must be done in domestic trade; (5) member 
countries' elasticities of excess demand and third countries' elasticities of excess 
supply must be high and member countries' elasticities of excess supply and 
third countries' elasticities of excess demand must be low - however, these   27
conditions vary according to the assumptions of the model employed in the 
analysis, those presented here apply to Meade's model when analyzing tertiary 
effects of CUs formation. 
Besides these conditions, there are other considerations that are relevant to 
this topic. Patnerships with the lowest cost producers of goods that are important 
in the home country's trade flows is likely to increase welfare as the chances of 
trade diversion are reduced. Similarly, in accordance with Tinbergen's (1957) 
conclusions - referenced in Gunter (1989) - about the size of the CU, increases in 
the market size that the CU makes available to member countries are likely to 
be welfare improving and therefore relatively small countries are likely to benefit 
proportionally more from their association with large countries than the latter 
with the former. Transportation costs also help determine the outcome of a CU; 
ceteris paribus, the lower are transportation costs among member countries, 
the greater the gains stemming from the CU. 
Highly controversial and seemingly not extensively researched is the esta-
blishment of CUs among countries with wide differences in economic 
development. The NAFTA appears to be the first FTA between developed 
countries and a LDC and despite of the impressive number of studies conducted 
on this particular case there is a lack of both more general and theoretical research 
in this field. Opposite arguments have characterized an intense debate on the 
consequences of such an agreement for the three partner countries (specially 
for the U.S. and México, given the relative importance of their bilateral trade). 
Wage differentials, which favored the potential location of labor intensive 
industries in México, are perceived as one of the most relevant comparative 
advantages of México within the agreement while the gap in technology and 
efficiency in most economic activities tends to favor U.S. producers. Taking into 
account the hypothesized differences about the likely impact of the agreement 
on member countries' economies, perhaps the most signif icant issue arising from 
this debate is that of adjustment costs and their implications for the realization 
of the gains from trade. 
The complexity of the elements that have been mentioned as relevant in 
choosing partner countries when forming CUs, highlights the fact that even if   28
countries were truly free to choose their preferential partners in trade the selection 
of the most appropriate may in practice be more a matter of circumstantial 
conditions than of scientific judgment. 
4.   Other Issues of Relevance 
4.1 Multilateralism vs. Regionalism 
CUs and other forms of regional economic integration have been subject to 
question about their effective interaction with the achievement of free trade on 
a multilateral basis, which is the optimum solution in terms of resource allocation 
and economic welfare. What must be clarified is if regional economic integration 
is a step towards global free trade or, on the contrary, an obstacle to this goal. 
Once again, in this aspect of CU research there are no conclusive results. 
The starting point in this topic is the recognition that maximizing national 
income is not the same as maximizing global income and, furthermore, that it is 
possible to maximize national income at the expense of other countries' welfare. 
The case for the optimal tariff argument is the first theoretical generalization of 
this issue; deliberately decreasing global output size increases the tariff issuing 
country's income. In fact, the same conditions that make possible the achievement 
of an optimal tariff preclude the possibility that a large country undertakes unila-
teral tariff elimination aimed at achieving global free trade. As McCulloch (1993) 
pointed out, "[b]ecause of adverse effects on its terms of trade, a large country's 
unilateral liberalization may raise world welfare yet lower its own. The apparently 
mercantilistic resort to reciprocal trade liberalization in multilateral negotiations 
provides needed assurance that each participant will capture part of the gains 
from the resulting increase in global efficiency" (p. 368). 
From the free trade point of view, the danger with regionalism is that trade 
diversion, while providing gains to participant countries, may block further 
liberalization attempts inasmuch as they imply risking those economic gains. 
Various sets of criteria have been established in order to determine whether or 
not a regional bloc is open - Krueger (1995), Corden (1995), Weintraub (1995). 
At least two conditions should be matched by a regional trading bloc to be 
considered as open; first, trade and investment barriers to non-member countries   29
must not be raised; second, new members willing to join the agreement and 
prepared to meet the established trade conditions should be easily accepted. 
Superficially observed, these conditions are likely to be met by almost every 
trade agreement; however, both have subtle complications. In the case of CUs, 
the average common external tariff may be lower than average individual tariff s 
before the CU while, simultaneously, higher than some particular pre-CU tariffs; 
as a consequence, increased levéis of protection may be granted for some sectors 
moving them away from international competition. Similarly, under PTAs or 
FTAs, manipulation of country-of-origin rules may raise levéis of protection for 
certain products or induce decreases in import levéis of third countries' goods 
by partner countries. Also, acceptance of new members into trade agreements 
may not be as easy a procedure as it seems; lack of clearcut accession rules tends 
to be a common characteristic in trade agreements and, particularly in the case 
of the highest levéis of economic integration, requirements related to domestic 
policies (such as social, labor, and monetary) and to political institutions (like 
the existence of 'western style' democracy) may prove to be highly restrictive. 
In the context of GATT's (WTO's) rules, regional trade agreements must 
comply with a three-part test (Article XXIV). First, third countries that are 
signatories of the G ATT must receive detailed notif ication about the agreement; 
second, 'substantially all' trade between partners must be involved within the 
agreement; and third, the agreement must not raise trade barriers toward third 
countries. Additionally, in spite of the fact that G ATT provisions requiring the 
regional trade agreement to be on balance trade creating,"... the presumption 
that an FTA must be more trade creating than trade diverting has been 
incorporated into GATT working party reviews of FTA notifications, and is now 
generally considered the key standard by which to judge the valué of FTAs to 
third countries." (Schott, 1989; p. 27) 
Most trade agreements that have been studied by GATT's working parties 
have not reached conclusive results on their compatibility with GATT rules. As 
expressed by Schott (1989), "[s]ince 1948, a total of 69 FTAs and preferential 
trade agreements, and subsequent amendments, have been examined by the 
GATT under the provisions of Article XXIV [. . .] GATT working parties have 
reported on each of these agreements. Only f our agreements were deemed to be   30
compatible with Article XXIV requirements; on the other hand, no agreement 
has been censured as incompatible with GATT rules." (p. 27) This ambiguity 
has often been perceived as a factor encouraging the formation of new regional 
trade agreements; political considerations and the recognition that most of GATT 
members take part in such agreements, persuade affected countries of the futility 
of criticizing them. A large number of countries devote increased efforts to 
developing and establishing regional trade agreements as a defensive reaction 
before the strengthening of trade blocs in different parts of the world. The risk 
of being left aside is too high for a country to remain passive in pursuing some 
form of integration. 
The dynamics of regional integration (and of open or disguised protectionism) 
have been so impressive that Mussa (1993) suggested a three-fold strategy as a 
practical device in pursuing free trade. First, free traders should recognize that 
rents matter, that is that in political processes what is at stake are the "... 
additional amounts that factors employed in a protected activity are likely to 
earn in comparison with their next-best alternative" (p. 375); in Mussa's opinion, 
what free traders can productively do is to cali decisión makers' attention to 
losses faced by consumers as the "cost of granting protection". Second, it is 
necessary to "avoid hysterical multilateralism" and to recognize that 
multilateralism per se does not assure free trade; bilateral and regional trade 
agreements have helped effectively to open world's trading system in spite of 
some negative effects on third countries through trade diversion effects (either 
accidental or intended). Third, it is convenient to accept the importance that a 
mercantilistic approach to trade negotiations has in reaching lower barriers to 
trade and that pure free trade is not always (and perhaps never) the best policy 
for all nations in all circumstances; in other words, economists "... should be 
more humble in recognizing the def iciencies of economics in teaching the strategy 
and tactics through which a relatively open system of world trade may be 
established and sustained." (p. 376) 
4.2 Effects of Protection over Efficiency 
Enhanced efficiency through forced competition as trade liberalization occurs 
is one of the traditionally mentioned dynamic effects of economic integration.   31
The source of this argument lies in Scitovsky's (1958) affirmation - referenced in 
Balassa (1987) - that economic integration helps improve effective competition 
by means of loosening monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures within 
individual countries. This idea was further extended by Leibenstein (1966) under 
the concept of X-efficiency. According to this argument, protectionism allows 
firms to employ their productive resources, including managerial skills, and to 
use the available technology at a lower level than the optimal in such a way that 
gains in efficiency stemming from forced competition (through trade 
liberalization) are expected to be greater than gains from the classical resource 
allocation effects. 
Gains from enhanced efficiency do not appear in the classic literature on CUs 
because within this framework it is assumed that firms, operating under perfect 
competition, choose the most efficient production methods and use them 
efficiently. To a great extent, the attractiveness of the X-efficiency argument lies 
in the large income gains than are associated with it and that make the idea of 
the "cold shower" so popular in discussing the integration of the British economy 
with those of European countries during the sixties and seventies. Lipsey (1960), 
for instance, admitting the lack of evidence on this topic referred to his "... 
personal guess that this is a very large potential source of gain, that an increase 
in competition with foreign countries who are prepared to adopt new methods 
might have a most salutary effect on the efficiency of a very large number of 
British and European manufacturing concerns." (pp. 512-513) 
Taking into account the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as well as income and 
substitution effects, Corden (1970) - referenced in Krauss (1972) - showed that if 
efficiency is assumed to depend on effort and if factor income effects outweigh 
substitution effects, factors used intensively in the production of exportables 
grow less efficient than factors used intensively in the production of importables 
as tariffs are reduced. As Krauss (1972) pointed out, the significance of Corden's 
conclusion is that in referring to efficiency gains there are also gainers and losers 
and that the mechanics of efficiency gains is not as straightforward as assumed 
popularly. 
With respect to the measurement of efficiency gains, Krauss (1972) argües 
that the evidence of X-efficiency effects presented by Leibenstein is no more   32
than a relatively narrow set of ad hoc experiences without systematic analysis 
that lacks theoretical support. As was mentioned earlier, the formalization and 
measurement of efficiency gains (in general that of dynamics effects) continue 
to be hard to achieve and the dispute on the accuracy and validity of these 
estimates is far from being settled. Finally, it has been argued that the case for 
efficiency gains is more an argument in favor of unilateral tariff elimination 
than one on CU f ormation; opposing this opinion, some authors claim that this 
position dismissed income gains arising from increases in output associated 
with sales of goods to partner countries and that, therefore, forced efficiency 
provides higher economic welfare gains in the context of CUs (Balassa, 1987). 
4.3 Economic Development 
The questioning of orthodox CU theory from the standpoint of 
developmentalism has its roots in the static character of the resource allocation 
gains that constitute the basis of this type of analysis. Most of the advocates of 
what Robson (1983) has called a "Developmental Theory of Integration among 
Developing Countries" assume that the protection of certain economic activities 
in developing countries (mainly industry) is valid either for reasons of income, 
the rate of economic growth, or non-economic objectives. 
The importance assigned to economies of scale in the developmental approach 
makes it closer to the dynamic effects approach than to any other perspective 
within economic integration theory. Simultaneously, consideration of 
divergences between private and social costs, particularly under the form of 
wage fixity, lead to the recognition that production gains through economic 
integration are lower than when no domestic distortions are assumed (an 
argument that reinforces the importance of long-term gains from integration). 
In summary, within the developmental approach it is considered that "... 
the gains from integration must be exploited by member countries on a mutual 
basis, by the exchange of markets within the customs union or common market 
or other preferential area, so that they can be secured without a sacrifice of the 
structural developmental objectives of individual member states" (Robson, 1983; 
p. 7). Consequently, issues such as the infant industry argument, the rate of   33
domestic capital f ormation, the inflow of f oreign investment, external economies 
(or positive externalities), the rationalization of the structure of new (or post-
CU) production, the access to new technology, and enhanced bargaining power 
for member countries are the main topics within this approach. 
From the aforementioned issues it is clear that from the developmental 
viewpoint the case for CUs is a case for protection instead of economic 
liberalization. In the f ormation of CUs the lowest-cost producer among member 
countries will benefit from enlarged markets and preferential access to them -
these benefits include the cost reduction effect (Corden, 1972); on the other hand, 
high-cost producers face losses from the potential disappearance of their 
industries but experience consumption gains from lower price imports that may 
be realized also by means of unilateral tariff reductions. Robson (1983) shows 
that lowest-cost producer's gains are greater than high-cost producers' losses 
and theref ore that there is a case for integration as a better alternative than uni-
lateral tariff reduction. 
If a wide enough range of industries exists in prospective member countries, 
it may be possible that all of them will obtain gains by exchanging markets in a 
CU even without resorting to compensation. This is, essentially, the preference 
for industry argument developed by Cooper and Massell (1965) and further 
elaborated by Dosser (1972) - ref erenced in Robson (1983) - that has been attacked 
as applied to developed economies (on the grounds that direct production 
subsidies are more efficient) but whose importance has been recognized in the 
context of developing economies (Krauss, 1972). Since the CU's industry would 
be a high-cost producer as compared to international competition, the case for 
CUs in this context is, as was mentioned before, a case for protectionism and the 
validity of this protection rests on the possibility that sheltered industries are 
characterized by declining long-run marginal cost curves (the infant industry 
argument). 
An alternative way of characterizing this perspective of economic integration 
arises when it is taken into consideration that industries developed under these 
circumstances are mainly import-substituting and therefore trade diverting. The 
preference for industry, then, may have important economic motivations (not   34
only non-economic and irrational motives) such as the importance assigned to 
the achievement of external economies and enhanced introduction of advanced 
productive and managerial technologies created by industry. In Hazlewood 
(1987) words, "... the preference may have a long-run, growth oriented basis, 
rather than a short-run allocation-oriented basis" (p. 744). 
An additional consideration on this topic is that larger markets, as provided 
by CUs, stimulate investment and economic growth. While focusing on the 
importance of domestic or member countries investment was characteristic of 
the 1940's to 1970's wave of regional integration (particularly in Latin American 
countries), currently the emphasis is on obtaining foreign direct investment (FDI). 
In general, the issue of attracting investment relates to the consideration of factors 
of production mobility in the context of CUs. Viner (1950) referred tangentially 
to this topic while discussing his position on the economies of scale issue, 
basically to point out that unless CUs appreciably increase inter-member 
countries mobility of factors of production, their impact on the expansion of 
output of industries without increasing unit-costs would be nil. Meade (1955), 
analyzed the effects of factor mobility within CUs and considering that 
restrictions to mobility usually take the form of quantitative immigration quotas 
or exchange controls, concluded that primary effects of mobility must account 
for the majority of welfare changes and that the consequent reduction in relative 
scarcities of factors of production must be beneficial for the economy. 
However, if factor mobility between member and non-member countries is 
taken into account, welfare losses appear as a consequence of resource allocation 
changes stemming from trade diversion within the CU; in this sense, factor 
mobility substitutes for trade, producing negative indirect effects on welfare for 
non-member countries (Balassa, 1987). On the other hand, FDI from non-member 
countries may have a positive indirect effect on their income arising from the 
fact that this may be the only available short-run way to have access to member 
countries' protected markets. 
Subtle welfare implications arise when FDI is considered in the context of a 
member country in which foreign firms have been already established. Tironi 
(1976) analyzed this problem in the context of a partial equilibrium framework,   35
considering the existence of rents on factors of production or assets exclusively 
owned by foreign firms, the presente of positive externalities from FDI
3, and 
the possibility that the stock of capital available in the country may change as a 
consequence of further flows of foreign capital. Tironi introduces the concepts 
of "foreign profit diversion effect" and "foreign profit creation effect" to account 
specifically for the welfare effects arising from the impact of the CU on foreign 
firms activities. The "foreign profit diversion effect" is the transfer of part of the 
foreign firms' rents to local consumers that arises as a consequence of the increase 
in imports because of the CU; analogously, the "foreign profit creation effect" is 
the increase in foreign firms' rents that have regional comparative advantage 
and are, therefore, able to expand their production under the CU. Thus, welfare 
effects of a CU on member countries when foreign firms exist will also depend 
on the balance between the "foreign profit diversion effect" and the "foreign 
profit creation effect"; if the latter is likely to be greater than the former, the host 
country may not gain from the CU unless some policies designed to transfer 
part of the foreign firms' additional rents are implemented. 
Closely related to the FDI issue, the access to modern productive and 
managerial technologies has been one of the key elements within the 
developmental approach to economic integration. Both the presence of foreign 
firms and the increase in competition through the CU may induce the adoption 
of new technologies and the strengthening of research and development 
activities; additionally, economic integration may create an appropriate 
environment for the transmission of technical knowledge by means of academic 
networks, increased familiarity of consumers with new products, and 
partnership between producers and traders from different countries. 
When CUs are formed by developing countries, their relative smallness, both 
in economic and political terms, gives rise to a couple of issues that are f requently 
mentioned in the literature. The first one refers to the limited scope of any trade 
                                                           
3 These positive externalities have been traditionally related to: (1) advanced technologies, 
new products, and superior entrepreneurial knowledge, (2) employment opportunities and 
training of local labor forcé; and (3) taxes paid to host countries. However, Tironi argües that 
they are apparent and not true economic externalities and agrees with Caves (1974) in that host 
countries' gains depend upon the spill-over that occurs when foreign firms are not able to cap-
ture all quasi-rents stemming from to their productive assets (Tironi, 1976). 
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expansion following the formation of the CU due to low previous integration 
among them. In this case, weak benefits from integration would be obtained 
immediately and the impact on resource allocation would be important only in 
the long-run; as Robson (1983) has pointed out, it is clear that "... the more 
underdeveloped economies are at the time of their integration, the less important 
will be the gains from rationalizing the existing structure of production relative 
to those to be derived from rationalizing new industrial production" (p. 14). In 
this perspective, integration is deemed as a necessary stage for the less developed 
countries in the process of achieving higher levéis of development and 
establishing more open economies. The second issue relates to the possibility 
for member countries to increase their bargaining power in external economic 
and political relations. Gains in terms of trade are more easily realized through 
collective action by means of CUs than by isolated negotiations on the part of 
individual countries. Besides, according to this vision, CUs allow less developed 
countries to achieve more economically the goals that have been traditionally 
served by pure protectionism. 
4.4 Domestic Policies 
Coordination of domestic policies among partner countries is frequently cited 
as a critical issue in economic integration. In the classical CU theory the topic is 
indirectly outlined by Viner (1950) when referring to the difference between 
revenue duties and protective duties. Revenue duties are mainly intended to 
raise revenues and therefore do not operate as incentives to the domestic 
production of products that are similar to those paying the duties. While revenue 
duties are not expected to be trade distortive, in the context of CUs their 
elimination poses the problem either of guaranteeing other sources of revenue 
or of adjusting domestic policies to the new budget situation. On the other hand, 
Meade (1955) refers explicitly to the problem of policy coordination in the 
framework of CU analysis. Intervention in domestic policies is necessary to 
assure that full equilibrium is reached by partner countries; the so called tertiary 
adjustments in CU formation refer to the harmonized application of trade, 
inflation, and exchange rate controls.   37
The recognition that domestic policies may influence trade flows as well as 
the allocation of factors of production has called analysts attention beyond 
Viner's and Meade's treatment of this issue. In fact, industrial policies, social 
policies, fiscal policies, monetary policies, and exchange rate policies are 
considered as relevant to CUs and to economic integration in general (Balassa, 
1987). Industrial policies, for instance, may imply the adoption of credit 
preferences and/or tax benefits that can be applied either "horizontally" (across 
the board) or "vertically" (to particular activities). While the former do not create 
distortions as long as they are granted on a neutral basis, that is without favoring 
a specific activity, the latter generate distortions that may offset the effects of the 
intra-CU tariff elimination. Additionally, if social policies are based upon gene-
ral tax revenues, labor costs may be subsidized in practice and henee factor 
movements responding to differences in this type of costs generate misallocation 
of resources; as a general rule, resource allocation is sensitive to the way social 
security is financed among member countries of a CU. 
Exchange rate flexibility allows countries to offset differences in the conditions 
of competition arising from indirect taxes - given that they may be applied on 
imports but rebated on exports (under the destination principie) - as well as the 
effects of having the origin principie of taxation applied in one country - indirect 
taxation on production irrespective of the country of sale - and the destination 
principie applied in another. However, other trade distortions arising from fis-
cal policy can not be corrected without changes in this area. If one country applies 
cascade-type taxation (in which the tax burden is raised with the stage of 
processing of the products) and another applies value-added taxation, the 
resulting distortions in trade can only be eliminated by unifying the taxation 
principie across countries - to the value-added principie (Balassa, 1987). Where 
coordination or unification of monetary and fiscal policies is aimed within 
economic integration processes, it has been proposed that fixed exchange rates 
be established among member countries; according to Balassa (1987), exchange 
rate fixity should be regarded as the final outcome of policy coordination. 
From the developmental perspective, Robson (1983) argües that the 
unwillingness of member countries to harmonize their non-tariff policies has 
had negative repercussions on attracting foreign investment flows. Lack of   38
domestic policies harmonization tends to block the possibility of sharing markets 
within economic integration arrangements and therefore foreign capital does 
not find incentives in the establishment or enlargement of industries to serve 
extended markets. 
5.   Critical Issues 
5.1 Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) 
The reduction in tariffs that has been achieved through several rounds of 
multilateral negotiations and numerous bilateral and regional trade 
arrangements is paralleled by the increase in non-tariff barriers during the last 
four decades (Mussa, 1993). Although most of Viner's (1950) list of devices that 
may render CUs inoperative in freeing trade among partner countries have been 
removed or partially removed through trade negotiations, a new set of protective 
measures has emerged as a powerful obstacle to effective economic integration. 
Bureaucratic procedures and " administrative protectionism" in the form of 
antidumping laws, countervailing measures, and standards and regulations 
provide the basis for precluding free market access for partner countries and 
third countries as well. Bureaucratic procedures required by governments, such 
as obtaining permits, paying administrative fees, and certifying goods, have 
been used as disguised f orms of protectionism in different countries; this practice 
is based on the principie that information costs and transaction costs may be 
artificially increased in order to become effective barriers to trade. Antidumping 
and countervailing measures are the most widely used GATT-consistent 
instruments of "administered or contingent protection" among developed 
countries and have been gaining increased importance in the context of less 
developed countries' trade policies in recent years (Leidy, 1994). 
There are three factors that have contributed to the spread of this type of 
protective measures to non-traditional users (less developed countries); first, 
the effectiveness of antidumping measures as a selective protection device; 
second, interna! political pressure in countries that have been liberalizing trade; 
and third, the possibility of replacing other protective measures by one that is   39
internationally sanctioned (Leidy, 1994). In spirit, antidumping and countervai-
ling measures are intended to offset the effect of "unfair" trading practices as 
opposed to safeguard policies that are targeted at economic disruption arising 
from "fairly" traded goods. Unfair trading relates to practices such as pricing 
below cost, international price discrimination, and predatory pricing. While 
justifiable in its goals, antidumping measures seem to be frequently used for 
protectionist purposes and create incentives for economic agents and therefore 
affect resource allocation. One of the most pervasive effects of the use of 
antidumping policies is its impact on the structure of competition; antidumping 
regimes can create conditions that are favorable to collusion and provide greater 
market shares for domestic firms (Leidy, 1994). These mechanisms may be 
collectively used by member countries against third countries' industries but 
are also suitable for intra-CU use. As Low and Nash (1994) point out, one of the 
current challenges for trade policy is to limit the use of such mechanisms, or to 
minimize their potentially damaging effects on the gains from trade. 
The use of standards and regulations as protectionist measures has been 
frequently mentioned in the economic integration literature. Norms specifying 
required characteristics of imported goods may be used as disguised forms of 
protectionism. Strict and sometimes artificially high standards may act as 
effective barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary regulations applied to 
agricultural products, for instance, are able to block market access for products 
from specific countries or regions of origin. The trend towards the establish-
ment of life-cycle management measures in the context of environmental 
regulations, which encompasses norms related to production, distribution, 
consumption, and disposal processes of traded goods, is generating an increasing 
concern about its potential role as a non-tariff barrier. Life-cycle management 
measures addressing production externalities may constitute the basis for trade 
discrimination, particularly in referring to trade relations between developed 
and developing countries. Since these measures must be established on a non-
discriminatory basis, they do not represent, in principie, a more important 
obstacle to intra-CUS trade than to trade with third countries; however, they 
may be relevant in determining the outcome of CUs inasmuch as they affect 
trade flows between member countries and third parties.   40
5.2 Rules of Origin 
A particular feature of PTAs and FTAs is the possibility of trade deflection. In 
fact, as each member country has its own tariff levéis before third countries, 
imports may enter the agreement's area through the country that applies the 
lowest tariff; similarly, when trade in intermediate goods is allowed production 
and investment deflection may also occur (Balassa, 1987). If it is assumed that 
terms of trade remain unchanged, trade deflection should increase member 
countries' economic welfare because it diminishes the extent of trade diversion 
effects; however, the intended level of protection would be violated. On the other 
hand, if terms of trade are allowed to change, trade deflection will negatively 
affect economic welfare in member countries and will do the opposite in non-
member countries (Balassa, 1987). Production deflection may happen if 
differences in tariffs outweigh differences in production costs, therefore firms 
have incentives to relocate according to tariff levéis instead of comparative 
advantages; patterns of investment may also be influenced by the reallocation 
of industries. 
Since trade, production, and investment deflection may affect the net outcome 
of economic integration, the imposition of rules of origin for traded goods has 
become an essential component in PTAs and FTAs. Basically, rules of origin 
limit the intra-area freedom of mobility to those commodities that contain a 
minimum amount or proportion of domestically produced goods or that have 
been substantially transformed in any of the member countries. Even though 
necessary "... to preserve the value of preferences granted in a trade agreement . 
. ." (Schott, 1989; p. 25), rules of origin are subject to pressures to serve as 
protectionist devices. Tough rules of origin may act as deterrents to trade in 
cases in which imported inputs are intensively used in the production of 
commodities for export in member countries. The intent to manage rules of origin 
to protect domestic industries may be considered a non-tariff barrier. 
Another aspect of rules of origin is that they increase transaction costs. 
Customs inspection is necessary to determine the domestic content of traded 
commodities and its complexity varies according to the methodology that has 
been agreed. Although the costs of customs inspection are rarely prohibitive,   41
they offset part of the benefits that accrue from trade; besides, the administrative 
requirements of the procedure itself may generate uncertainty among traders 
discouraging trade flows. 
5.3 Environmental and Labor Standards 
Even though pertaining to the category of non-tariff barriers (as standards 
and regulations), environmental and labor standards deserve specific mention 
inasmuch as they have gained increased important in the context of economic 
integration. Both are currently perceived as the most relevant non-tariff barriers 
to trade, either in bilateral and regional or multilateral trade negotiations. 
There are two major sources of interaction between environmental and labor 
standards and trade (Charnovitz, 1992). First, the effects of the former on terms 
of trade; that is, whether or not disparate standards allow fair competition among 
countries. Second, the effects of trade on the environment and workers; that is, 
to what extent trade benefits or degrades the environment and makes workers 
better off or worse off. Within these lines, a diverse set of issues and controversies 
characterize the discussion of this topic. There is, for example, increasing concern 
in developed countries about what has been called "social dumping". The term 
refers to the possibility that some countries may rely upon low environmental 
standards to boost their exports; in these circumstances, "clean" domestic 
production may be displaced by "dirty" imports, unregulated foreign 
competitors may underprice their products, and investment may be diverted 
towards polluter havens. Although possible, there is uncertainty about the 
occurrence of these effects (OECD, 1993) and furthermore there is strong 
questioning as to why the existence of differing standards should be 
characterized as unfair. Pollution control subsidies constitute another policy 
that may be regarded as the source of unfair trade. Similarly, issuing high 
standards for imports or introducing life-cycle management policies on 
environmental grounds may constitute forms of trade discrimination. 
On the labor front, the possibility that governments may assist national 
exporters or foreign firms operating in their countries allowing them to operate 
under substandard conditions within "union-free" enclaves is one of the   42
permanent worries in the negotiation of trade agreements. Even in the absence 
of "union-free" zones the presence of diff ering labor standards among countries 
(member and non-member countries), such as mínimum wages, child labor, and 
the right to collective bargaining, may be considered either as another form of 
"social dumping" or as part of a nation's comparative advantage. 
Environmental and labor considerations currently play a major role in 
multilateral trade negotiations and seem to be less important in the context of 
bilateral or regional integration where it is accomplished among countries with 
low disparities in their levéis of development. However, as the NAFTA shows, 
they may be of great importance in attempting to integrate developed and 
developing countries not only because of their likely impact on trade flows, but 
also because of the attempt to use trade restrictions in order to pursue 
environmental and labor goals. 
5.4    Adjustment Costs 
There are two topics that usually lack explicit consideration in discussing 
economic integration, but in the context of integrating economies with dissimilar 
levéis of development have great relevance. As the discussion on the NAFTA 
illustrates, adjustment costs and distributive effects of integration may be decisive 
in determining the outcome of economic integration. 
These topics have tended to be overlooked due to the proclivity of theoretical 
works to measure the gains from integration by means of comparing alternative 
equilibria, pre and post-integration, without consideration of the costs involved 
in moving from one situation to the other (McCulloch, 1993). The gains from 
trade, therefore, are overstated not only because displaced resources may remain 
idle for a considerably long period, involving opportunity costs and social and 
political difficulties, but also because unintended distributive effects may result. 
The usual assumption in the analysis is that undesired distributive effects can 
be reversed costlessly by means of lump-sum transfers and that government 
funding can be obtained in the same way through ideal lump-sum taxes. 
However, in analyzing the impact of economic integration is common to evaluate 
the distributive effects of the implemented policies instead of considering the   43
neutralization of policy-induced redistribution of income (McCulloch, 1993); it 
is worthwhile noting that the latter alternativa may affect some of the positiva 
effects accruing from economic integration as it may affecfimportant variables 
such as the rate of domestic savings. 
Another dimension of adjustment costs arises if it is taken into account that 
acceptance into CUs or other form of economic integration may imply the 
fulfillment of certain requirements. Adoption of particular economic policies 
(such as exchange rate or monetary policies) or even social policies may be 
required and their corresponding costs can be regarded as "entry-fees". Careful 
consideration of economic, social, and political adjustment costs, although 
necessary, is difficult and its absence may be a powerful incentive either in fa-
vor of the status quo and protectionism or in favor of unrestricted and potentially 
damaging liberalization. 
6.   Concluding Comments 
This survey's main "conclusion" is that the development of CUs theory has 
been dominated by the second best nature of CUs themselves. From the vast 
amount of litera ture produced from the decade of the 1950s to the beginning of 
the 1990s, relatively scarce "general principies" have been devised. The 
preeminence of empirical research over theoretical developments, the latter 
rather devoted to adding more realistic assumptions to "old" models or to 
incorporating new issues into the analyses, has largely contributed to this 
outcome. To some extent, it may be said that empirical results have lacked 
systematic linkages with theoretical developments. 
That is not to say that CUs theory and empirical research lack significance. 
On the contrary, CUs theory and research have proved an important branch of 
economics, political economy, and trade policy studies and, no doubt, they will 
continue to be so. However, it appears that developments in this area will become 
even more fragmented, following the path traced by the advance of globalization 
and its emerging issues. 
Initially, and f or around a decade, CUs theory f ocused on analyzing its welf are 
effects. Then, economists' interest shifted towards understanding the rationale   44
for countries to enter into CUs arrangements, largely an issue of economic 
rationality versus non-economic motivations. Approximately from the mid-
seventies, diverse long-standing issues within CUs theory gained momentum 
and most of research efforts were devoted to their analysis. Topics such as the 
terms of trade effects on welfare, the interaction between CUs formation and 
changes in terms of trade, partner-choosing issues, the effect of economies of 
scale on welfare outcomes, and the rationale for achieving economic 
development through participating in CUs, are good examples of research areas. 
With the advance of economic integration worldwide and the emergence of 
the "new trade theory", CUs research deepened its trend towards exploring a 
vast array of topics making it more difficult to put its findings together into a 
single theory. Nowadays, it seems, CUs theory is yielding the way to a set of 
topics that have been brought into economists' attention by the rapid advance 
of economic integration. The recent fast growth of international trade, enhanced 
capital mobility (partly owed to the spread of information technologies and the 
trend towards financial liberalization), the ascent of regionalism and bloc 
formation, to ñame a few, are among the issues determining this fragmentation 
of CUs theory. 
In spite of these changes in the direction of research and notwithstanding 
that what may be considered as a well-developed theory on CUs is lacking, the 
"old" concepts of trade creation and trade diversion continue to be the basic 
yardstick to judge the economic outcome of a CU and other forms of economic 
integration. Likewise, what we know as CUs theory has provided the framework 
for much of the economic analysis on this topic of undeniable importance.   45
REFERENCES 
Arndt, Sven W (1969) "Customs Unions and the Theory of Tariffs"'; American Economic 
Review, 59, pp. 108-118 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1971) "Customs Unions and Welfare Improvement"; in Economic 
Journal, 81, Sept. 
Balassa, Bela (1987) "Economic Integration"; entry in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 
Economies, Stockton Press; New York, pp. 43-47 
Charnovitz, Steve (1992) "Environmental and Labor Standards in Trade"; in The World 
Economy, 15 (3), pp. 335-356 
Cooper, C.A. and Massell, B.F. (1965) "A New Look at Customs Unions Theory"; in 
Economic Journal, 75, pp. 742-747 
Corden, WM. (1970) "The Efficiency Effects of Trade and Protection"; in I.A. McDougall 
and R.H. Snape (eds.) Studies in International Economics: Monash Conference Paper?, North-
Holland Publishing, Amsterdam 
Corden, WM. (1972) "Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory"; in Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 80; pp. 467-475 
Corden, WM. (1995) "A Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area: Implications for Latín 
America"; in Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere; IDB/ECLAC, Washington D.C. 
Dosser (1972) "Customs Unions, Tax Unions, and Development Unions"; in R.M. Bird 
andJ.G. Head (eds.) Modern Fiscal'Issues: Essajs in Honor of CarIS. Shoup, Toronto University 
Press; pp. 86-103 
Feenstra, Robert (1990) Distributing the Gains from Trade with Incomplete Information, 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, No. 3277 
Findlay, Ronald (1987) "Terms of Trade"; entry in The Neu> Palgrave: A Dictionary of 
Economies, Stockton Press; New York, pp. 623-626 
Floystad, G. (1975) "Non Discriminating Tariffs, Customs Unions, and Free Trade"; in 
Kjklos, 28, pp. 641-644   46
Fríes, T. (1984) "Uncertainty as a Possible Rationale for Customs Unions"; Journa/ of 
International Economics, 17, pp. 347-357 
Gunter, Frank R. (1989) "Customs Unions Theory: Retrospect and Prospect"; in David 
Greenaway, Thomas Hyclack, and Robert Thornton (eds.) Economic Aspects of Regional Trading 
Arrangements, New York University Press; Washington Square, New York 
Harmsen, Richard and Leidy, Michael (1994); "Regional Trading Arrangements"; in 
Naheed Kirmani (team leader) International Trade Policies. The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Volume 
II. Background Papers; International Monetary Fund; World Economic and Financial Surveys 
Harrison, Glenn; Rutherford, Thomas; and Wooton, lan (1993) "An Alternative Welfare 
Decomposition for Customs Unions"; in Canadian Journal of Economics, 26, pp. 961-968 
Hazlewood, Arthur (1987) "Customs Unions"; entry in Tbe New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 
Economics, Stockton Press; New York, pp. 743-744 
Hirschman, Albert (1981) "Three Uses of Political Economy in Analyzing European 
Integration"; in A. Hirschman Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond; Cambridge 
(England): Cambridge University Press 
Johnson, H.G. (1962) "The Economic Theory of Customs Union"; in Money, Trade, 
and Economic Growth, George Alien & Unwin, London, pp. 46-73 
Johnson, H.G. (1965) "An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and 
the Formation of Customs Unions"; in Journal of Political Economy, 73, pp. 256-283 
Kemp, M.A. (1969) A Contribution to the General Equilibríum Theory of Preferential Trading, 
North-Holland Publishing, Amsterdam 
Krauss, Melvyn B. (1972) "Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory: An 
Interpretive Survey"; in Journal of Economic Literature, 10, pp. 413-436 
Krissoff, Barry and Sharp les, Jerry (1993) "Preferential Trading Arrangements in Western 
Hemisphere Countries"; in Agricultural  and Resource Economics Review, 22 (1), pp. 48-58 
Krueger, Anne (1995) "Conditions for Maximizing the Gains from a WHFTA"; in Trade 
Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere; IDB/ECLAC, Washington D.C. 
Krugman, Paul R. (1993) "The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade"';American 
Economic Review, 83, pp. 362-366 
Leibenstein, H. (1966) "Allocative Efficiency versus X-Efficiency"; in American Economic 
Review, ]une 
Leidy, Michael (1994) "Antidumping: Solution or Problem in the 1990s?"; in 
International Trade Policies. The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Volume II. Background Papers, 
International Monetary Fund; Washington, D.C. 
Lipsey, Richard G. (1957) "The Theory of Customs Unions: Trade Diversion and Welfare"; 
in Economica (NS), 24, pp. 40-46   47
Lipsey, Richard G. (1960) "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey"; in The 
Economic Journal, 70, pp. 496-513 
Lipsey, Richard G. (1991) "The Case for Trilateralism"; in Steven Globerman (ed.) Con-
tinental Accord: North American Economic Integration, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, Canadá 
Low, Patrick and Nash, John (1994) "The Long and Winding Road Toward Freer World 
Trade"; in Finance & Development, 31, pp. 58-61 
McCulloch, Rachel (1993)   "The OptimaHty of Free Trade: Science or Religión?"; in 
American Economic Review, 83, pp. 367-371 
Meade, J.E. (1955)  The Theory of Customs Unions; North-Holland Publishing Company; 
Amsterdam; 2nd printing, 1966 
Melvin, J. (1969)   "Comments on the Theory of Customs Unions", Manchester School 
Economic and Social Studies, 36(2), June 
Michael, Michael and Miller, Stephen (1992)  "Customs Union and the Harris-Todaro 
Model with International Capital Mobility"; in Open Economies Review, 3, pp. 37-49 
Michael, Michael and Hatzipanayotou, Panos (1992)   "Variable Labor Supply and the 
Theory of Customs Union"; in Keio Economic Studies, 29, pp. 63-71 
Mussa, Michael (1993) "Making the Practical Case for Freer Trade"; in  American Economic  
Review, 83, pp. 372-376 
OECD (1993)   Summary Report  of the Workshop on Environmental Policies and Industrial 
Competitiveness; 28-29 January, Paris 
Pearce, I.F. (1970) International Trade, book I; Macmillan, London, pp. 210-224 
Robson, Peter (1983) Integration, Development and Equity. Economic Integration  in West África, 
George Allen & UNWIN, London 
Schott, Jeffrey J. (1989)  More Free Trade Areas?; Institute for International Economics; 
Policy Analysis in International Economics 27; Washington, DC, May 
Scitovsky, T. (1958)   Economic Theory and Western European Integration; George Alien & 
Unwin, London 
Staiger, Robert (1994) A Theory of Gradual Trade Liberalization; Cambridge, Mass.: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, No. 4620 
Tinbergen, J. (1957) "Customs Unions: Influence of their Size on their Effect"; in 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economies, 113, pp. 404-414 
Tironi, Ernesto (1976) Customs Union Theory and Foreign Direct Investment, Center for Latin 
American Development Studies; Boston University; Discussion Paper Series, no. 21 
Vanek, J. (1965)   General Equilibrium of International Discrimination. The Case of Customs 
Unions; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press   48
Viner, Jacob (1950) The Customs Union Issue; Anderson Kramer Associates; Washington, 
DC, 1961 edition 
Weintraub, Sidney (1995) " Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Getting from Here to There"; 
in Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere; IDB/ECLAC, Washington D.C. 
Williamson, J. (1971) "Trade and Economic Growth"; in J. Pinder (ed.) The Economics of 
Europe, Charles Knight and Co., London 
Wonnacott, R. and Wonnacott, P. (1967) Free Trade Between the United States and Canadá, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Wonnacott, P and Wonnacott, R. (1981) "Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a 
Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tuntís"; American Economic Review, 
71,pp. 704-714 
Wonnacott, Ronald (1990) "U.S. Hub-and-Spoke Bilateral and the Multilateral Trading 
System"; C.D. House Institute, no. 23, Toronto, Canadá 
Yeh, Yeong-Her (1992) "Tariffs, Import Quotas, and Customs Unions"; in Atlantic 







La Facultad de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario busca desarrollar 
espacios donde el conocimiento superior en Economía se dinamice por la 
investigación, la exposición y la crítica académica. En estos términos la 
serie "Borradores de Investigación" pretende ser un medio de divulgación 
y discusión de los trabajos desarrollados por los investigadores adscritos a la 
Facultad, y en caso dado, de trabajos externos que sean de interés en las 
líneas de investigación de la misma. Las opiniones expresadas en dichos 
documentos son particular responsabilidad de los autores y por lo tanto no 
deben ser interpretadas como propias de la Facultad de Economía ni de la 
Universidad del Rosario. 
Es un propósito principal de la Facultad el institucionalizar mecanismos que 
fomenten la investigación como factor clave para el desarrollo y la aplicación del 
conocimiento económico y dinamicen, así mismo, los programas de 
educación avanzada. Las líneas de investigación de la Facultad de Economía 
se dirigen a las siguientes temáticas particulares: Regulación Económica, 
Violencia, Narcotráfico, Economía Laboral, Pobreza y Desigualdad, Econo-
mía Rural y Economía Financiera. 
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